Abstract. In order to be able to explicitly reason about beliefs, we've introduced a non-monotonic formalism, called the Autoepistemic Logic of Beliefs, AEB, obtained by augmenting classical propositional logic with a belief operator, B. For this language we've de ned the static autoepistemic expansions semantics. The resulting nonmonotonic knowledge representation framework turned out to be rather simple and yet quite powerful. Moreover, it has some very natural properties which sharply contrast with those of Moore's AEL.
Introduction
Logic programs, deductive databases, and, more generally, non-monotonic theories, use various forms of default negation, not A, whose major distinctive feature is the fact that not A is assumed in the absence of \su cient evidence" supporting the formula A. The meaning of \su cient evidence" depends on the speci c semantics used. For example, in Reiter's original Closed World Assumption, CWA 18] , not A is assumed if A is not provable, or, equivalently, if there is a minimal model in which A is false. On the other hand, in Minker's Generalized Closed World Assumption, GCWA 10, 7] , or in McCarthy's Circumscription, CIRC 9] , not A is assumed only if A is false in all minimal models. In Clark's original Predicate Completion Semantics 5] for logic programs, this form of negation is called negation-by-failure because not A is derivable whenever attempts to prove A nitely fail.
For example, the clause: Runs(x) not Broken(x) is intended to say that in the absence of \su cient evidence" that the car is broken, we can use the default belief that it is not broken and thus conclude that it runs. Consequently, if we don't have any additional information (or \evidence") we infer that the car works ne.
While default negation is an inherent part of any commonsense reasoning system and, in particular, it constitutes an important feature of all logic programs and deductive databases, it also often leads to contradictory information. This occurs when (subjective) default beliefs clash with the known (objective) information or with some other default beliefs.
Suppose that given the above clause: Runs(x) not Broken(x) we nd out that the car in fact does not run:
:Runs(MyCar):
The resulting knowledge base seems to be contradictory. On the one hand, given our default assumption that the car is not broken, we should conclude that it runs and yet, on the other hand, we know that it does not run. What should we conclude?
A common-sense approach suggests that in order to avoid such inconsistencies we should refrain from adopting default beliefs that contradict the existing factual information. In this particular case, we could conclude that our initial belief (assumption, hypothesis) that the car is not broken must have been incorrect and thus has to be revised or rejected. This form of common-sense reasoning is akin to the logical principle of reasoning known as \reductio ad absurdum".
Consider now the following program clause:
:Broken(x) not FlatTire(x); not BadBattery(x) which is intended to say that in the absence of any indication that something is wrong with the tires or with the battery we can conclude that the car is not broken. Assuming that this is all that we know about the car, we are likely to conclude that it is not broken because we have no indication that would make us believe that there is any problem with either its battery or tires. In other words, both FlatTire and BadBattery are believed to be false by default.
Suppose, however, that upon inspection we learn that our car is in fact broken, i.e., suppose that we add Broken(MyCar) to our knowledge base. Again, the resulting theory turns out to be inconsistent because we still have no indication of any problem with either battery or tires and thus not FlatTire and not BadBattery continue to hold true.
As in the previous case, the common-sense approach suggests that in order to avoid such inconsistencies we should refrain from adopting beliefs that contradict the existing factual information or are mutually contradictory. In this particular case, we could conclude that at least one of our initial default beliefs (assumptions, hypotheses) that the car does not have a at tire and does not have a bad battery must have been incorrect and thus it has to be revised or rejected.
However, standard non-monotonic formalisms, such as circumscription, autoepistemic logic and major semantics proposed for logic programs and deductive databases, do not provide any mechanisms for revising or rejecting contradictory beliefs and thus, when faced with similar inconsistencies, they end up in a contradiction. In order to remedy this situation, in this paper we investigate the issue of belief revision, i.e., the problem of reconciling beliefs with con icting facts by an appropriate revision of beliefs, and we propose a rather general belief revision framework for non-monotonic reasoning. As a byproduct, we obtain a precise description of the nature of the mismatch between facts and beliefs which is shown to have an important application to diagnosis.
While rejection of contradictory beliefs may prevent us from deducing contradictory conclusions, simply refraining from believing in certain facts may not be enough as it does not take into account all the consequences of withholding of such beliefs. In order to produce such consequences we must revise the theory itself by adding to it statements that result in the elimination of contradictory beliefs. In other words, we must compile into the theory additional knowledge that prevents the occurrence of the detected belief inconsistency. Accordingly, in this paper we also propose a rather general mechanism for belief revision by means of theory change.
Instead of con ning our discussion to some narrow class of non-monotonic theories, such as the class of logic programs with some speci c semantics, we conduct our study so that it is applicable to a broad class of non-monotonic formalisms. They include the well-known formalisms of circumscription, autoepistemic logic and all the major semantics recently proposed for logic programs, including stable, well-founded, stationary and other semantics.
Speci cally, we conduct our study of belief revision within the broad knowledge representation framework of the AutoEpistemic logic of Beliefs, AEB, introduced by Przymusinski in 15, 17] . AEB constitutes a powerful and yet simple unifying framework for non-monotonic reasoning formalisms which was shown to isomorphically contain all of the above mentioned formalisms as special cases 1 .
Autoepistemic Logic of Beliefs, AEB, has some very natural properties which sharply contrast with those of Moore's Autoepistemic Logic, AEL. In particular, every belief theory T in AEB has the least (in the sense of inclusion) static expansion T which has an iterative de nition as the least xed point of a monotonic belief closure operator. Moreover, least static expansions are always consistent in the broad class of a rmative belief theories de ned later in the paper.
In order to deal with contradictory beliefs, we rst introduce the notion of a careful autoepistemic expansion, a simple and yet powerful extension of the notion of a static expansion of belief theories, which enables us to incorporate belief revision into the framework of AEB. When applied to the above example involving a bad battery and at tires, the proposed approach results in two consistent careful autoepistemic expansions. In one of them we believe that the battery is ne but possibly the tires are not, and, in the other we believe that the tires are ne but possibly the battery is dead. When taken together, the two expansions imply that most likely either the tires or the battery, but not both, are to blame for the car's trouble. They represent therefore an intuitively appealing approach of rejecting those beliefs that contradict factual information, while keeping all the remaining ones intact.
We prove that every consistent belief theory has a consistent careful expansion. This result demonstrates that we can always assign a reasonable set of revised beliefs to any 1 For simplicity, the class of belief theories considered in this paper does not use the epistemic operator L and thus it does not include Moore's autoepistemic logic, AEL, as a special case. However, a simple extension of the discussed framework, described in 15, 17], isomorphically contains AEL.
belief theory and underscores the important role played by belief revision in commonsense reasoning. We also show that every consistent static expansion of a belief theory T is also a careful autoepistemic expansion of T and therefore the class of careful expansions extends the class of consistent static expansions. Moreover, for a broad class of a rmative belief theories, de ned below, careful expansions coincide with static expansions.
Belief revision based on the notion of a careful autoepistemic expansion can be applied to various reasoning domains. In this paper we illustrate its natural application to the domains of diagnosis and declarative debugging of logic programs. Here the fact that all consistent theories have consistent careful autoepistemic expansions plays a crucial role because it is imperative that we should be able to derive a reasonable set of conclusions (diagnoses, bugs) from any given knowledge base T even though the observable facts may appear to contradict beliefs resulting from default assumptions contained in T.
Careful autoepistemic expansions represent a form of belief revision in which the rational epistemic agent abstains from believing formulae which, when believed, would lead to a contradiction. However, as we mentioned before, simply refraining from believing in certain formulae does not eliminate the contradictory information present in the knowledge base and it also does not take into account all the consequences of withholding of such beliefs. For example, faced with the fact that the car does not run we may decide to revise our belief that the car is not broken (cf. Example 4.1.). However, that should also compel us to refrain from believing in the related fact that the car does not need to be xed.
We propose a natural solution to this problem using the previously introduced notion of a careful autoepistemic expansion. The proposed approach is based on the appropriate revision of the original theory itself instead of just the revision of our beliefs about it. Speci cally, we change the theory by adding to it new information that results in the elimination of contradictory beliefs. In other words, we compile into the theory the knowledge that prevents the same belief inconsistencies from occurring again.
In some application domains, beliefs may logically depend on other beliefs, which may be viewed as more basic and sometimes considered to be non-revisable. For example, this is true when diagnosing faults in a device: causally deeper component faults are sometimes preferred over surface faults, that are simply consequences of the former. In such cases, one may want to control the level at which diagnosis is performed, by eliminating diagnoses which do not focus on the causally deeper faults. In declarative debugging, one may know in advance that some predicates are speci ed correctly (e.g., those that are part of a previously debugged program) so that any observable bugs involving these predicates must necessarily be caused by the incorrect speci cation of the remaining predicates. More generally, any revision of beliefs should comply with any given speci cation of mutual dependency of beliefs. We illustrate how one can express such dependencies in AEB by means of the so called Belief Completion Clauses. These clauses essentially state that a revision of some beliefs requires a revision of beliefs on which they logically depend.
Because of its generality, this method of specifying the logical level of revision in belief theories can be employed to explain and justify, via embedding of logic programs into AEB, the meta-linguistic devices used for controlling abduction, view updates, declarative debugging and contradiction removal in logic programs. Moreover, the fact that it is expressible in the object-language, rather than in some meta-language, leads to a computationally simpler solution. In particular, in 3] we prove that the contradiction removal semantics for non-disjunctive extended logic programs, introduced by the rst two authors in 13, 12] , can be isomorphically embedded into the more general framework of the Autoepistemic Logic of Beliefs.
Autoepistemic Logic of Beliefs
We rst brie y recall the de nition and basic properties of the Autoepistemic Logic of Beliefs, AEB. By an a rmative belief theory we mean any belief theory all of whose clauses satisfy the condition that m > 0. In other words, a rmative belief theories are precisely those belief theories that satisfy the condition that all of their clauses contain at least one objective atom in their heads 2 Observe that arbitrarily deep level of nested beliefs is allowed in belief theories. We assume the following two simple axiom schemata and one inference rule describing the arguably obvious properties of belief atoms:
(D) Consistency Axiom:
:B? (1) (K) Normality Axiom: For any formulae F and G: B(F G) (BF BG) (2) (N) Necessitation Rule: For any formula F:
The rst axiom states that tautologically false formulae are not believed. BF . If a formula F is true in all minimal models of T then we write: T j= min F and say that F is minimally entailed by T. For readers familiar with circumscription, this means that we are considering predicate circumscription CIRC(T; K) of the theory T in which atoms from the objective language K are minimized while the belief atoms BF are xed:
T j= min F CIRC(T; K) j= F: In other words, minimal models are obtained by rst assigning arbitrary truth values to the belief atoms and then minimizing objective atoms.
Static Autoepistemic Expansions
Like in Moore's Autoepistemic Logic, also in the Autoepistemic Logic of Beliefs we introduce sets of beliefs that an ideally rational and introspective agent may hold, given a set of premises T. We do so by de ning static autoepistemic expansions T of T, which constitute plausible sets of such rational beliefs. T = Cn (T fBF : T j= min Fg); where F ranges over all formulae of K B .
The de nition of static autoepistemic expansions is based on the idea of building an expansion T of a belief theory T by closing it with respect to: (i) the derivability in the logic AEB, and, (ii) the addition of belief atoms BF satisfying the condition that the formula F is minimally entailed by T . Consequently, the de nition of static expansions enforces the intended meaning of belief atoms described above. Note that negations :BF of the remaining belief atoms are not explicitly added to the expansion although some of them will be forced in by the Normality and Consistency Axioms (2) and (1).
De nition 2.5. Static Semantics] By the (skeptical) static semantics of a belief theory T we mean the set of all formulae that belong to all static autoepistemic expansions T of T. Every belief theory T in AEB has the least (in the sense of set-theoretic inclusion) static expansion T which has an iterative de nition as the least xed point of the monotonic belief closure operator T de ned below.
De nition 2. Moreover, the least static expansion T of a belief theory T can be constructed as follows. Let T 0 = Cn (T ) and suppose that T has already been de ned for any ordinal number < . If = + 1 is a successor ordinal then de ne: T +1 = T (T ) = Cn ( T fBF : T j= min Fg ); where F ranges over all formulae in K B . Else, if is a limit ordinal then de ne T = S < T . The sequence fT g is monotonically increasing and has a unique xed point T = T = T (T ), for some ordinal . For nite theories T the xed point T is reached after nitely many steps. Observe that the least static autoepistemic expansion T of T contains therefore those and only those formulae which are true in all static autoepistemic expansions of T and therefore it always coincides with the static semantics of T. It is easy to verify that a belief theory T either has a consistent least static expansion T or it does not have any consistent static expansions at all. Moreover, least static expansions of a rmative belief theories are always consistent 15, 17].
Example 2.1. Consider the following belief theory T: Car Car^B:Broken Runs For simplicity, when describing static expansions of this and other examples we list only those elements of the expansion that are \relevant" to our discussion. In particular, we usually omit nested beliefs. In order to iteratively compute the least static expansion T of T we rst let T 0 = Cn (T ). Let us observe that T 0 j= Car and T 0 j= min :Broken. Indeed, in order to nd minimal models of T 0 we need to assign an arbitrary truth value to the only belief atom B:Broken, and then minimize the objective atoms Broken; Car and Runs. We easily see that T 0 has the following two minimal models (truth values of the remaining belief atoms are irrelevant and are therefore omitted): M 1 = fB:Broken; Car; Runs; :Brokeng; M 2 = f:B:Broken; Car; :Runs; :Brokeng: Since in both of them Car is true, and Broken is false, we deduce that T 0 j= min Car and T 0 j= min :Broken. Consequently, since T 1 = T (T 0 ) = Cn (T fBF : T 0 j= min Fg), we obtain:
T 1 = Cn (T fBCar; B:Brokeng): Since T 1 j= Runs and T 2 = T (T 1 ) = Cn (T fBF : T 1 j= min Fg), we obtain:
T 2 = Cn (T fBCar; B:Broken; BRunsg): It is easy to check that T 2 = T (T 2 ) is a xed point of T and therefore T = T 2 = Cn (T fBCar; B:Broken; BRunsg) is the least static expansion of T. The static semantics of T asserts our belief that the car is not broken and thus runs ne. One easily veri es that T does not have any other (consistent) static expansions.
Logic Programs as Belief Theories
One can easily show that Circumscription is properly embeddable into the Autoepistemic Logic of Beliefs, AEB. In 15, 17] it was also shown that major semantics de ned for normal and disjunctive logic programs are also embeddable into AEB. In particular, this is true for the well-founded, stable and stationary (or partial stable) semantics of normal logic programs. In the next section we recall an analogous result for the stable semantics of extended logic programs with so called \classical negation " 6] .
Suppose that P is a normal logic program consisting of rules: A B 1^: : :^B m^n ot C 1^: : :^not C n The translation of P into the a rmative belief theory T B: (P ) is given by the set of the corresponding clauses: B 1^: : :^B m^B :C 1^: : :^B:C n A (5) obtained by replacing the non-monotonic negation not F by the belief atom B:F , and by replacing the rule symbol ! by the standard material implication .
The translation, T B: (P ), gives therefore the following meaning to the non-monotonic negation: not F def B:F F is believed to be false :F is minimally entailed: (S) A^ A ? or, equivalently, A :A; which says that A and its opposite A cannot be both true. Formally, the addition of the axiom schema (S) means that the set Cn (T ) of formulae derivable from a given belief theory T, used in the de nition of the static expansion, is now replaced by the smallest set, Cn s (T ), which contains the theory T and all the (substitution instances of) the axioms (K), (D) and (S) and is closed under the necessitation rule (N). For example, a proposition A may describe the property of being \good" while the proposition A describes the property of being \bad". The strong negation axiom states that things cannot be both good and bad. We do not assume, however, that things must always be either good or bad. As the following result shows, we can use strong negation to translate extended logic programs with \classical negation", originally introduced in 6], into belief theories. 16] , and consistent static autoepistemic expansions T of its translation T B: (P ) into belief theory, in which \classical negation" of an atom A is translated into A.
In particular, (total) stable models (or answer sets) M of P, as de ned in 6], correspond to those consistent static autoepistemic expansions T of T B: (P ) that satisfy the condition that for all objective atoms A, either BA 2 T or B:A 2 T . Since the axiom (S) has no e ect on those belief theories T that do not include strong negation atoms A, in the sequel we will assume the axiom (S) without any further mention whenever strong negation is used. For a more detailed study of strong negation the reader is referred to 3].
Explicit Negation
In some commonsense reasoning domains, even the strong negation axiom (S) appears to be too strong 2, 3] , and is thus replaced by the following explicit negation inference rule:
A B:A and the following explicit negation axiom: (EA) BA^B A ? for every atom A in K. Both of these assumptions can be shown 3] to be weaker than the strong negation axiom (S).
Formally, the addition of the inference rule (ER) and the axiom (EA) (instead of the axiom (S)) means that the set Cn (T ) of formulae derivable from a given belief theory T, used in the de nition of the static expansion, is now replaced by the smallest set, Cn e (T ), which contains the theory T and all the (substitution instances of) the axioms (K), (EA) and (D), and is closed under both the necessitation rule (N) and the explicit negation rule (ER). Both strong and explicit negations can be easily generalized to arbitrary, non atomic, formulae 3].
In order to avoid confusion between strong and explicit negation, from now on we will denote the explicit negation of an atom A by A instead of A. While the intended meaning of the strong negation A of A is \the opposite of A", the intended meaning of explicit negation A is \there is evidence against A". In particular, since the strong negation axiom (S) does not hold for explicit negation, it is possible to have both A (i.e., \evidence for A") and A (i.e., \evidence against A") in the same model of a belief theory. Having evidence both for and against a given proposition occurs frequently in common-sense reasoning.
Since the explicit negation inference rule (ER) and the axiom (EA) have no e ect on those belief theories T that do not include explicitly negated atoms A, in the sequel we will assume them both without any further mention whenever explicit negation is used. As the following result shows, we can use belief theories with explicit negation to obtain the well-founded semantics with explicit negation originally de ned in 11]: Theorem 2.4. Embeddability of WFSX Semantics] 11] There is a one-to-one correspondence between the partial stable models M of an extended logic program P with \explicit negation", as de ned in 11], and the consistent static autoepistemic expansions T of its translation T B: (P ) into belief theory, where \explicit negation" of an atom A is translated into A. For a more detailed study of explicit negation the reader is referred to 3].
Belief Revision
While static expansions seem to provide a natural and intuitive semantics for many (consistent) belief theories (in particular, for all a rmative belief theories) they often lead to inconsistent expansions for theories in which (subjective) beliefs clash with the observable (objective) facts or with some other beliefs. In particular, this applies to belief theories and logic programs with strong (or explicit) negation.
Example 3.1. Consider again the simple belief theory introduced in Example 2.1.. As we have seen, its static semantics implies that we believe that the car is not broken and thus runs ne. Suppose, however, that upon inspection we found out that the car actually does not run:
:Runs:
It is clear that the resulting new belief theory does not have any consistent static expansions. Indeed, since there is no evidence that the car is broken, Broken is false in all minimal models and thus B:Broken is derivable. This implies Runs and thus results in a contradiction. In other words, our belief that the car is not broken and thus runs, based on the fact that there is no evidence to the contrary, apparently contradicts the objective fact that the car does not run.
In view of the contradictory factual information that the car does not run, we could very well conclude that our initial belief (assumption) that the car is not broken must have been incorrect and thus has to be revised and rejected. Example 3.2. Consider now the belief theory discussed in the introduction: B:F latTire^B:BadBattery :Broken Broken; which says that, in the absence of any indication that something is wrong with the tires or with the battery, we can safely conclude that the car is not broken, and yet the fact is that it is broken. This theory, again, does not have any consistent static expansions because both :F latTire and :BadBattery are minimally entailed and thus the premise B:F latTireB :BadBattery is derivable. This implies :Broken and results in a contradiction. Again, a natural way to remedy this problem is to conclude that, in view of the contradictory objective information that the car is broken, at least one of our initial beliefs (assumptions) that the car does not have a at tire and does not have a bad battery must have been incorrect and thus has to be revised and rejected.
Careful Autoepistemic Expansions
The approach illustrated in the previous two examples is based on the idea of rejecting or revising beliefs that contradict the existing factual information or are mutually contradictory. It leads to a simple modi cation of the de nition of static expansions which results in a natural and potent framework for belief revision in AEL.
De nition 3.1. Careful Autoepistemic Expansion] A belief theory T is called a careful autoepistemic expansion of a belief theory T if it satis es the following xed-point equation:
T = Cn (T fBF : T j= min F and T fBF g is consistentg); where F ranges over all formulae of K B . The only di erence between the de nition of static expansions and careful expansions is the requirement that only those belief atoms BF should be added to the expansion whose addition does not lead to a contradiction. Recall that, by de nition, T fBF g is consistent if and only if Cn (T fBF g) is consistent. Example 3.3. It is easy to see that the theory considered in Example 3.1. has precisely one careful expansion, namely T = Cn (T fBCar; B:Runsg); which does not include any beliefs about the car being broken and corresponds therefore to the intuitive approach of rejecting beliefs that contradict existing factual information. Example 3.4. On the other hand, the theory considered in Example 3.2. has precisely two careful expansions namely:
T 1 = Cn (T fBBroken; B:F latTireg); T 2 = Cn (T fBBroken; B:BadBatteryg); which re ect the fact that one of the assumptions about not having a bad battery or not having a at tire has to be rejected while the other can be kept without causing any inconsistency. The resulting semantics implies therefore B:F latTire _ B:BadBattery and thus suggests that most likely the car does not have both a bad battery and a at tire. It represents the intuitively appealing approach of rejecting only those beliefs that contradict factual information, while keeping all the remaining ones intact.
Example 3.5. Suppose that our belief theory T simply says: BGod: Clearly, T does not have any consistent static expansions. Indeed, since it does not o er any evidence for the existence of God, it yields B:God resulting, by virtue of the Consistency Axiom (D), in a contradiction with BGod. However, T has precisely one consistent careful static expansion which coincides with the closure Cn (T ) of T in AEB. The belief B:God is not added because it leads to inconsistency.
As the previous examples demonstrate, careful autoepistemic expansions no longer lead to inconsistencies when we add to our knowledge facts that seem to contradict our (default) beliefs. Proposition 3.1. All careful expansions of a consistent belief theory are consistent.
Proof:
Let T be a belief theory and let T be a careful expansion of T. By de nition, T = Cn (T fBF : T j= min F and T fBF g is consistentg): Consequently, if T were inconsistent then we would have T = Cn (T ) and thus T would also have to be inconsistent.
It turns out that every consistent belief theory has a consistent careful autoepistemic expansion. 
Let be some well-ordering of the set of all formulae of the propositional modal language, K B , and, let T be a consistent belief theory. By de nition, the theory T 0 = Cn (T ) is consistent and closed under the axioms (D) and (K) as well as the necessitation rule (N). Suppose that is an ordinal such that for all < consistent and non-decreasing theories T have been constructed which are closed under the axioms (D) and (K) and the necessitation rule (N).
If is a limit ordinal then we de ne T = S < T . Due to the compactness theorem, the theory T is also consistent and closed under the axioms (D) and (K) and the necessitation rule (N). If = + 1 is a successor ordinal then we choose the -least formula F with the property that:
T j= min F, T fBF g is consistent, BF 6 2 T , assuming such a formula F exists, and we de ne T +1 = Cn (T fBF g). Otherwise, we de ne T +1 = T .
The so constructed trans nite sequence of theories is non-decreasing and therefore there must exist a such that T +1 = T is a xed point. De ne T = T . We have to show that: T = Cn (T fBF : T j= min F and T fBF g is consistentg): Clearly, T Cn (T fBF : T j= min F and T fBF g is consistentg). It su ces therefore to show that T Cn (T fBF : T j= min F and T fBF g is consistentg). For that purpose it is enough to prove that, for any ordinal , if T j= min F then T j= min F.
Suppose that T j= min F and let M be a minimal model of T . If M were not a minimal model of T then there would exist a smaller model N of T which coincides with M on all belief atoms. However, since T di ers from T only by the addition of some belief atoms, this means that N would also be a smaller model of T , which is impossible. This shows that M is a minimal model of T and thus F must be true in M. Consequently, T j= min F which completes the proof.
This result demonstrates that we can always assign a reasonable set of revised beliefs to any belief theory and thus underscores the important role played by belief revision in commonsense reasoning. It is also of crucial importance in applications of belief revision, such as the application to diagnosis illustrated below, where it is imperative that we should be able to derive a reasonable set of conclusions (diagnoses) from any given knowledge base T even though the observable facts may appear to contradict beliefs resulting from default assumptions contained in T.
The class of careful expansions extends the class of consistent static expansions. Moreover, for a rmative belief theories, the notions of a consistent static expansion and a careful expansion coincide. Theorem 3.2. Every consistent static expansion of a belief theory T is also a careful expansion of T.
Let T be a belief theory and let T be a consistent static expansion of T. By de nition, T = Cn (T fBF : T j= min Fg): Since T is consistent, T fBF g is consistent, for every F such that T j= min F. Consequently, T = Cn (T fBF : T j= min F and T fBF g is consistentg), which shows that T is a careful expansion of T. Proof: >From Theorem 3.2. it follows that all consistent static expansions are also careful expansions. We need to show that every careful expansion of an a rmative theory T is a consistent static expansion of T.
Let T be an a rmative belief theory and let T be a careful expansion of T. Since a rmative belief theories are consistent 15, 17] , it follows from Proposition 3.1. that T is consistent. By de nition, T = Cn (T fBF : T j= min F and T fBF g is consistentg). It su ces to show that T fBF g is consistent for every F such that T j= min F. For that purpose it su ces to prove that T = Cn (T fBF : T j= min Fg) is consistent. We rst show that T 0 = T fBF : T j= min Fg (K) is consistent as a standard propositional theory, where (K) represents all instances of the normality axiom. Let M be an interpretation in which all objective atoms A are true and those and only those belief atoms BF are true for which T j= min F. Since T is a rmative all the clauses of T are satis ed in M. Moreover, all instances of the normality axiom (K) are satis ed as well because if B(F G) and B(F ) are true in M then T j= min (F G)^F and thus T j= min G and consequently B(G) is also true in M. This shows that T 0 is consistent as a standard propositional theory.
Suppose that a consistent theory T n has been already de ned and let T n+1 = T n fBF : T n j= Fg: An analogous argument shows that T n+1 is consistent as a standard propositional theory. Clearly, T is the xed point T n = T n+1 of this sequence of theories and therefore it is also consistent, which completes the proof.
Application to Diagnosis
Belief revision based on the notion of a careful autoepistemic expansion can be applied to various reasoning domains. Below we illustrate its application to the domain of diagnosis.
For any careful expansion T of a belief theory T the set R(T ) = fF : T j= min F and yet BF 6 2 T g, namely, the set of those formulae F which should be believed in (because F is minimally entailed) in the expansion T , and yet are not believed in T (because of the resulting inconsistency), plays an important diagnostic role by constituting the set of possibly false assumptions.
De nition 3.2. Revision Set of a Careful Expansion] The revision set R(T ) of the careful autoepistemic expansion T of a belief theory T is de ned by:
R(T ) = fF : T j= min F and BF 6 2 T g: Clearly, a careful expansion is a static expansion if and only if its revision set is empty. R(T 1 ) = f:BadBatteryg R(T 2 ) = f:F latTireg i.e. in T 1 we refrain from believing :BadBattery, while in T 2 we refrain from believing :F latTire. As a result, the rst revision set suggests that our assumption that the car does not have a bad battery may have been wrong and the second revision set suggests that our assumption that the car does not have a at tire may have been incorrect. Both of them together provide us with a useful diagnosis of possible reasons why the car does not work.
Belief Revision by Theory Change
In this section we study the issue of belief revision by theory revision, as opposed to belief revision by rejection of contradictory beliefs which was discussed in the previous section.
As remarked earlier, careful autoepistemic expansions represent a form of belief revision where the rational epistemic agent abstains from believing formulae which, if believed, would lead to contradiction. However, simply refraining from believing in certain formulae is often not enough, as it does not fully take into account all the consequences of withholding such beliefs. In order to produce such consequences we must revise the theory by adding to it some statements that justify not holding the contradictory beliefs. In other words, we must compile into the theory additional knowledge that will prevent the detected belief inconsistency from occurring. This knowledge is gathered by analyzing the causes of inconsistencies.
Example 4.1. Suppose that to the theory of Example 3.1. we add:
Car^Broken FixIt It is easy to check that the resulting theory T has a single careful expansion: T = Cn (T fBCar; B:Runs; B:F ixItg) Even though :Broken is true in all minimal models of the expansion, B:Broken is not added since it leads to inconsistency. Since Broken is no longer believed to be false, one would intuitively expect :F ixIt not to be believed either. However, this is not the case in the careful autoepistemic expansion above. Indeed, the expansion re ects only the fact that the agent must refrain from believing formulae that lead to contradiction. It does not invalidate the reasons that have led to such beliefs. In our example, we believed in the car not being broken because of the lack of evidence showing otherwise. This lack of evidence must therefore be invalidated by admitting the possibility that the car might in fact be broken.
This is the stance taken by most belief revision systems, where the outcome of revision is a modi ed theory, in which contradiction is avoided by eliminating the reasons for contradictory beliefs. It is clear that the only way of inhibiting :Broken from being believed in static expansions is by introducing some evidence for Broken to be true. This evidence could, for example, be stated in the form that Broken is in fact true. However, this appears too strong: absence of belief in :Broken does not warrant jumping to such a conclusion. We need only the weaker statement that Broken is possible, i.e. there is at least one minimal model with Broken, so that, given our notion of evidence, there is no longer absence of evidence for the car not being broken. In such case, we would no longer believe :Broken. Moreover, :F ixIt would no longer be minimally entailed, and thus would no longer be believed. Careful expansions already identify and inhibit the addition of beliefs that lead to contradiction. It is thus an easy matter to determine which sets of formulae do lead to contradiction: they are the revision sets R(T ) of careful expansions T .
Revised Autoepistemic Expansions
Given a careful expansion T of a belief theory T one can revise T by adding to it the \possibility of F being false" for every F in the revision set R(T ). How can this be done?
Most belief revision systems take the position that if the belief in a given formula F leads to contradiction then its complement :F should be assumed to be true. In our opinion this is, in general, unwarranted. First of all, it is not necessary to do so in order to inhibit the belief. Moreover, it is unwarranted to jump to a conclusion that some formula is true simply because belief in its falsity would lead to contradiction. That would be tantamount to imposing the law of the excluded middle on our beliefs, i.e. assuming the axiom BF _ B:F .
In Example 4.1., we simply would like to prevent :Broken from being believed. Given the meaning of beliefs, this can be arranged by changing the theory just enough so that \Broken is no longer false in all minimal models" or, equivalently, by \guaranteeing the existence of a minimal model in which Broken is true". Technically, this is achievable by adding to the theory the clause Broken_Maybe Not(Broken), where Maybe Not(Broken) is an atom not occurring elsewhere in the theory, and thus not constrained in value. This clause can be read as \Broken is possible". Intuitively, this constitutes the \minimal" change of the theory ensuring that contradiction is removed. Indeed, believing :Broken leads to contradiction and therefore Broken should be possible, which e ectively and declaratively prevents believing in :Broken.
For the sake of modularity, instead of adding the clauses of the form F _ Maybe Not(F), we prefer the addition of Possible(F), where Possible(F) is de ned by:
Possible(F) F _ Maybe Not(F) (7) De nition 4.1. Revision of a Belief Theory] A belief theory T r is a revision of a consistent belief theory T if and only if T r = T fP ossible(:F) : F 2 R(T )g for some careful autoepistemic expansion T of T.
Theorem 4.1. Revised Autoepistemic Expansion] Let T r be a revision of a consistent belief theory T. Then T r is consistent and has a consistent least static autoepistemic expansion. The least static autoepistemic expansion of T r is a revised autoepistemic expansion of T.
Proof:
Let T be a careful autoepistemic expansion of the consistent theory T, and let T r = T fP ossible(:F) : F 2 R(T )g.
Since T is consistent, and T r only di ers from T on clauses of the form F _Maybe Not(F), where Maybe Not(F) is an atom not occurring elsewhere in T, it is easy to see that T r is also consistent.
To prove that the least static expansion of T r is also consistent, we begin by proving the following lemma: (:F) it must also contain :F . By Theorem 2.1., it is guaranteed that the sequence of the fT r g, constructed by successive applications of the belief closure operator , is monotonically increasing and has a unique xed point. Thus, it is enough to prove that the obtained xed point is consistent. Moreover, since T is consistent, it su ces to show that, for every T r in the sequence, and any formula F not containing any occurrence of atoms of the form Maybe Not(G): BF 2 T r ) BF 2 T Suppose that is an ordinal such that for all < , if BF 2 T r then BF 2 T .
If is a limit ordinal, since by de nition of the sequence T r = S < T r , then, by the compactness theorem for all BF 2 T r , also BF 2 T . If = + 1 is a successor ordinal, then BF 2 T r i T r j= min F or BF 2 T r . If BF 2 T r then, by hypothesis, BF 2 T . Otherwise, the proof proceeds by contradiction assuming that BF 6 2 T . In that case, since T is a careful expansion, either there is a minimal model of T with :F , or all of its minimal models have F but T fBF g is inconsistent. If the latter holds F 2 R(T ), and so, by lemma 4.1., there is a minimal model of T r with :F . Thus T r 6 j= min F { contradiction.
If there is a minimal model of T with :F then, since T di ers from T r only by the addition of some belief atoms and clauses Possible(G), it is clear that there must also exist a minimal model of T r with :F { contradiction. >From the above proof, the relation of revised expansions to careful autoepistemic expansions follows easily: Corollary 4..1 Relation to Careful Expansions] Let T r be a revised autoepistemic expansion of a consistent belief theory T. There exists a careful expansion T of T such that, for any formula F not containing any occurrence of atoms of the form Maybe Not(G), BF 2 T r ) BF 2 T .
Intuitively, this means that revised expansions are more skeptical than careful expansions, in that the latter add more belief formulae than the former. 
Controlling the Level of Diagnosis
The belief in a formula may be conditional upon the belief in another formula. This is particularly true when diagnosing faults in a device: causally deeper component faults are sometimes preferred over less deep faults, that are simply consequences of the former. In such cases, one would like to control the level over which diagnosis is performed, by preventing diagnoses which do not focus on the causally deeper faults. We now show that revised autoepistemic expansion have su cient expressive power to control the level of diagnosis. BadBattery Broken has a single revision: T fP ossible(Broken)g. The revised autoepistemic expansion contains both B:F latTire and B:BadBattery. This revision can be seen as a diagnosis of the car that just states the car might be broken. However, in this case, one would like the diagnosis to delve deeper into the car problems, and obtain one diagnosis suggesting a possible problem with a at tire and another suggesting a possible problem with a bad battery. This is justi ed by the fact that our belief in the car being broken seems to depend entirely on our belief that it either has a at tire or a bad battery. To obtain this more desirable result one has to somehow ensure that instead of just withholding our belief in the car not being broken we in fact also withhold our belief that the car neither has a at tire nor a bad battery. In other words, a revision of this theory should not be initiated by revising Broken but instead it should be initiated by revising FlatTire or BadBattery by adding either Possible(FlatTire) or Possible(BadBattery).
Note that, by the rule (N) and the axiom (K), the closure of T already contains: BF latTire _ BBadBattery BBroken: Thus, belief in the truth of Broken is already determined by the belief in FlatTire or in BadBattery. But By adding the completion rules for an atom A, we can therefore prevent revision to be initiated in B:A, i.e., in order to revise the belief in :A, beliefs in other literals on which A depends must also be revised. In diagnosis, the hierarchical component structure of artifacts naturally induces dependency levels into theories modeling them. In other words, we can impose, via belief completion clauses, the desired levels of diagnosis in artifacts.
Application to the debugging of logic programs
Here we illustrate the application of belief revision with completion clauses to declarative error diagnosis (or declarative debugging) of terminating normal logic programs, by rst translating the programs to AEB theories. The restriction to terminating programs aims to simplify the exposition: all the major logic programming semantics coincide for such programs and there are no errors due to loops Debugging of a logic program is required whenever the consequences of the program clash with the intended model of the user, and its goal is to detect the errors in the program. A debugger is declarative whenever the user needs only to know the intended model of an incorrect program to detect bugs. In particular, with a declarative debugger, the user does not need to know or be aware of the underlying operational behaviour of the program.
In terminating logic programs, errors manifest themselves only through two kinds of symptoms, or bug manifestations 19]:
wrong solution, when some ground atom is an undesirable consequence of the program, i.e. a consequence which is not part of the intended user model. missing solution, when some ground atom belongs to the intended user model, but is not a consequence of the program. Of course, whenever there is a missing or a wrong solution manifestation then the program is not correct with respect to its intended model, and so there must necessarily exist in it some bug requiring correction. In this case, the symptoms are that b is a wrong solution and c is a missing solution. The reader can easily check that the errors in this program that explain the clash are that c is uncovered, and that the rst clause is incorrect. In order to use belief revision in AEB to perform declarative debugging of normal logic programs, the rst step to take is to translate the programs into belief theories via the translation T B: (P ) which de nes their semantics in AEB. Moreover, in order to allow for the existence of incorrect clause instances, clause instances must be conditional upon the assumption of their correctness. To further allow for the possibility of uncovered atoms, for each atom a clause stating that it is true whenever the atom is uncovered, is required. This yields the following translation:
De nition 4.3. Debugging Translation] Let P be a normal logic program consisting of rule instances:
A B 1^: : :^B m^n ot C 1^: : :^not C n The translation T debug (P ) is given by the set of the corresponding clause instances: B:incorrect(r n ) (B 1^: : :^B m^B :C 1^: : :^B:C n A) or, equivalently:
B:incorrect(r n )^B 1^: : :^B m^B :C 1^: : :^B:C n A where r n is a unique name assigned to each clause instance n, plus a clause uncovered(A) A for each atom A in the language of P. All atoms of the form incorrect( ) or uncovered( ) are new, not occurring elsewhere in the theory. The following (easy to check) proposition shows that the di erences between T B: (P ) and T debug (P ) do not a ect the semantics of the resulting theory. In fact their static expansions coincide modulo the new predicates introduced, i.e. coincide on all formulae common to the languages of both theories. In fact, since there are no positive occurrences of atoms incorrect(r n ) in T debug (P ), :incorrect(r n ) is true in all minimal models, and so B:incorrect(r n ) must necessarily belong to all static expansions. Thus the addition of B:incorrect(r n ) to clauses does not a ect the expansion. Similarly for the addition of the clauses with the body uncovered(A). Stating that A is a missing solution of a program P simply means that, although A is not a consequence of the program, the user believes in A. So, just add BA to T debug (P ).
Stating that A is a wrong solution of a program P, means that, although A is a consequence of the program, the user believes A is false. So, just add B:A to T debug (P ).
Example 4.8. To state that c is a missing solution of the program in Example 4.6. simply add Bc to T debug (P ). Note that the resulting theory has no static expansions. Indeed, since it does not o er any evidence for c, it yields B:c, resulting in a contradiction with Bc. In order to obtain the errors of the program, belief revision over the resulting theory is required. The revisions of the theory identify the errors of the program. However, not all beliefs should be considered for revision: only those for incorrect( ) or uncovered( ). This e ect can be achieved by adding, for all the other atoms, their corresponding belief completion clauses. resulting from T debug (P ) plus Bc and the belief completion clauses, has a single revision, namely the one resulting from adding Possible(uncovered(c)) to the theory, stating that possibly atom c is uncovered. In fact this corresponds to the only error in the program.
Note that for debugging a logic program by using revision of AEB theories in this manner there is no need for a complete description of the intended model. A description of the detected symptoms is enough. This was the case in the example above, where nothing was stated about either a or b. If extra symptoms are detected, they can be incrementally added to the theory in order to nd additional errors of the program:
Example 4.10. If wrong solutions for both a and b become manifest, then we add to the theory fB:a; B:bg. The revision of the resulting theory is obtained by the addition of fP ossible(uncovered(a)); Possible(incorrect(r 1 ))g. Note that T fP ossible(incorrect(r 1 ))g is no longer a revision. Indeed, since there is no evidence for uncovered(b), all static expansion must have B:uncovered(b). Since Bc belongs to the theory, belief completion on b implies B:b (cf. the clauses shown in Example 4.9.). >From B:b and the fact that there is no evidence for incorrect(r 1 ) (i.e. the theory yields B:incorrect(r 1 )) a follows, resulting, by virtue of the Consistency Axiom (D) and necessitation (N), in a contradiction with B:a. In the debugging of logic programs it might be useful to dismiss certain errors from the start. This is an easy matter in AEB: it simply requires the addition of facts with the negation of the corresponding error atoms: The only revision of T is T fP ossible(incorrect(r 1 ))g.
Note that if :uncovered(b) were not added, the theory would have two revisions, T fP ossible(uncovered(b))g and T fP ossible(incorrect(r 1 ))g, meaning that either some clause for b is missing or that rule r 1 is incorrect.
Concluding Remarks
We have argued that common-sense reasoning requires that general non-monotonic reasoning formalisms pay due attention to the issue of revising sets of assumptions that lead to contradiction.
We then went on to show how controlled revision of assumed beliefs can be naturally formalized within the broad and exible framework of the auto epistemic logic of beliefs AEB. This logic encompasses other major general formalisms for non monotonic reasoning, for which such belief revision mechanisms have not yet been de ned.
Subsequently, we exempli ed the usefulness of our belief revision approach by applying it to the practical domains of model based diagnosis and debugging of normal logic programs, showing how one can resolve, in a natural and declarative way and without using meta linguistic devices, the issue of selective revision of beliefs.
For future work, we leave the application of AEB to the debugging of more general logic programs, and the debugging of AEB theories themselves.
